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U.S. Shadow Warriors &amp; The Origins Of Contragate:
Clandestine Warriors &amp; The Problem Of Their Disposal
(part 2 Of 6)
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department:  General
Published:  Friday, February 27, 1987
Editor's Note: Every historical change in modes of warfare has produced what is known as a
disposal problem: what to do with no longer needed troops. This is one of the less apparent causes
for America's current Iran-contra crisis. It is also a problem Washington confronts now that the
future of the 13,000- man contra army is very much in question. This is the second of a six-part series
by Pacifica News Service contributing editor Peter Dale Scott putting the Iran-contra scandal into
historical perspective. A former Canadian diplomat and a professor of English at the University of
California, Berkeley, Scott's books include "The War Conspiracy" and "The Assassinations." [The
Latin America Data Base (LADB) has received authorization by PNS to reproduce the six-part
series.] By Peter Dale Scott A "secret team" of covert operations buddies like Generals Singlaub
and Secord, and their CIA colleagues like Theodore Shackley and Felix Rodriguez, are at the
very heart of the Iran-Contra conspiracy to keep US funds flowing to the contras in defiance of
a Congressional prohibition. These men are not just fighting to preserve the contras. They are
plotting above all to preserve their own style of clandestine warfare, despite a post-Watergate
consensus uniting the White House, Congress, CIA and Pentagon that such covert operations
had become counterproductive to larger US interests. After widespread agreement that the CIA's
covert operations bureaucracy had become far too large, CIA directors under both Republican and
Democrat presidents moved to cut back the clandestine services to a fraction of their former size.
Thus CIA director James Schlesinger in 1973 under Nixon eliminated some 2,000 CIA positions,
and Stansfield Turner in 1977 under Carter eliminated 820 more. According to a recent major
study of the CIA, when Turner fired virtually all the operators in the Operations Directorate the
whole clandestine service "in effect, he eliminated the agency's special-project capability." But the
post-Watergate consensus faced the US government with the classic disposal problem produced
by every historical change in modes of warfare what to do with no longer needed troops. It was
a problem that first surfaced back in 1960, when CIA director Allen Dulles raised the issue with
President-elect John F. Kennedy of what to do with 1,500 well-trained and restive Cuban exile troops
if they were not unleashed promptly against Castro. What seemed like a disastrous consequence
of listening to Dulles then the Bay of Pigs fiasco seems minor now in light of the choices facing the
United States with its 13,000 Nicaraguan mercenaries. The disposal problem, in fact, has never gone
away. It has, instead, contributed to a succession of much larger disasters. For a while Bay of Pigs
veterans like Felix Rodriguez later supplying the contras when they could no longer be used with
impunity against Cuba, were reassigned to the CIA's secret war in Laos. When that war ended
in detente, and the Cubans came home to Miami, these terrorist tactics were used in a spate of
local bombings and murders. This belligerence abated when the Cuban Bay of Pigs veterans were
recruited for new secret wars the Angolan fiasco of 1975-76 and then, since 1981, in the training,
supplying, and "advising" of the contras. But the US special warriors were on the outs at the end
of the 1970s unpopular not just with the Carter White House but with their own agencies. While
it was Carter who forced Singlaub to resign in 1978 for his political insubordination, the CIA itself
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sidetracked Shackley and his deputy in Miami and Laos Thomas Clines, thus leading to their
resignations. Shackley and Clines were suspected of possible involvement in an arms deal with
Egypt, which allegedly bilked the US government out of $8 million. The deal was said to have been
put together by Shackley's former CIA contract employee Ed Wilson, who was later convicted on
other charges. Richard Secord was also investigated in the same arms deal, even after Reagan was
elected. He refused to take a lie detector test, was briefly suspended from his job, and after the case
was settled out of court, left the government in 1983. In plotting to preserve the contra operation
against Congressional disapproval, all four men Singlaub, Secord, Shackley and Clines were clearly
plotting for the survival of special warfare itself. Of all the US-backed covert wars, only the contra
operation was being managed by large numbers of American covert war experts. More directly than
this, all four men were fighting for personal vindication. Only by involving the White House in the
once discredited notion of clandestine warfare could they redeem themselves from the personal
disrepute into which they had all fallen. What is too little understood in the Contragate affair is
the extent to which these four Americans, even more than their Cuban cohorts, helped engender
the initial Reagan commitment to the contra cause. In the 1979-80 period, for example, General
Singlaub, having linked his political future to that of presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, twice
visited Central America to forge an alliance between the Reagan campaign and local backers of what
would later become the contra army. In the same period Singlaub's old Indochina colleague, Ted
Shackley, is alleged to have sent Ed Wilson to offer assassination services to Nicaraguan dictator
Anastasio Somoza, who at that point had been abandoned politically by President Carter and was on
the point of being ousted. In his biography of Ed Wilson, author Peter Maas charges that Shackley's
former deputy Tom Clines, "even before he left the CIA...was promoting a deal with...Somoza to
create a search-and-destroy apparatus against Somoza's enemies." If Congress is to deal resolutely
with the Contragate crisis, it must deal with more than the complex story of disappearing funds in
Swiss and Panamanian bank accounts. These are but the most recent symptoms of a much more
serious disease a self-serving determination by a small group of men to involve the US in a covert
war for which there is neither Congressional nor popular support. The Iran-contra scandal may
provide a third and final opportunity for the US government to dispose of the "disposal problem"
once and for all. [Part 1 of this series also appears in this issue of CENTRAL AMERICA UPDATE.
Parts 3 and 4 will be published in the 03/04/87 issue of CAU, and parts 5 and 6 in the 03/06/87 issue
of CAU.]
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